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Abstract. It is shown through examples ranging from Parmenides and Plato to Whitehead 
and Wittgenstein that beauty is central among the values that have made metaphysical 
theories appealing and credible. A common attitude would be that the aesthetic properties 
of metaphysical theories may be important for effective presentation but are irrelevant 
to the cognitive value of the theories. This however is question-begging, since it assumes 
without argument that ultimate reality is indifferent to value-considerations such as beauty. 
If on the contrary we allow that the aesthetic properties of theories may be cognitively 
relevant, which such properties should be considered? This question is explored in the 
final section of the paper.
The title of this essay is “Beauty and Metaphysics.” This may remind some 
of you of another, more famous, title: “Beauty and the Beast.” My hope, 
though, is that even those readers who regard metaphysics as beastly will 
be in favor of beauty, and so I will have at least a halfway chance of gaining 
your interest and approval. My thesis is that beauty is intimately involved 
in metaphysics, to the extent that beauty is central among the values that 
have made metaphysical theories appealing and credible. I will not claim 
that all metaphysicians have been deeply concerned about the beauty of 
their results; that would not be the case. Bertrand Russell, for instance, 
once wrote that “the point of philosophy is to begin with something 
so simple as not to seem worth stating, and to end with something so 
paradoxical that no one will believe it.”1 It would be rash to deny that 
Russell achieved this goal in some of his own philosophical endeavors! 
And on the other hand, beauty by itself is by no means a guarantee of 
metaphysical excellence. When Keats wrote, “Beauty is truth, truth beauty,” 
1 Bertrand Russell, „The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, Lecture II,“ in Readings in 
Twentieth-Century Philosophy, ed. William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian (London: 
The Free Press, 1963), 310.
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he neatly provided his own counterexample: his assertion is undeniably 
beautiful, but it is equally certain that it is not true.
Beauty, then, is not sufficient for success in metaphysics, and perhaps 
it is not necessary either. Nevertheless, I maintain that it has been, and 
continues to be, an important ingredient in the construction and reception 
of metaphysical theories. I shall illustrate this thesis with a few examples, 
drawn from the history of philosophy, among many others that could be 
adduced. We begin with the very founder of the metaphysical enterprise, 
Parmenides. Probably most of us have wondered, at one time or another, 
how Parmenides found it possible to believe in his own theory — a theory 
that outrages common sense and ordinary experience by denying the 
very existence of motion, change, and a plurality of objects in the world. 
To be sure, Parmenides offered arguments for his conclusion, and these 
arguments were later reinforced by those of his disciple Zeno. To many of 
us, though, the arguments seem insufficient; one may be puzzled by the 
paradoxes that are put forward, but they don’t seem to provide sufficient 
motivation for the even more paradoxical conclusion we are asked to 
accept. My proposal is that Parmenides was enthralled by what was for 
him the overwhelming beauty of the conception of Being he had arrived 
at, a conception partially conveyed in the following lines:
But motionless in the limits of mighty bonds, it is without beginning or end, 
since coming into being and passing away have been driven far off, cast out 
by true belief. Remaining the same, and in the same place, it lies in itself, and 
so abides firmly where it is. For strong Necessity holds it in the bonds of the 
limit, which shuts it in on every side, because it is not right for what is to 
be incomplete. For it is not in need of anything, but not-being would stand 
in need of everything... But since there is a furthest limit, it is complete on 
every side, like the body of a well-rounded sphere, evenly balanced in every 
direction from the middle; for it cannot be any greater or any less in one 
place than in another.2
Whether this description will strike you as compellingly beautiful I cannot 
say; probably different minds will have differing responses. But I believe it 
did strike Parmenides that way, and has so struck many other philosophers 
2 John Mansley Robinson, An Introduction to Early Greek Philosophy (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1968), 115 (Diels-Kranz 28 B 8).
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since his time, resulting in the incorporation of at least parts of his 
conception in their own theories. My hypothesis concerning Parmenides’ 
aesthetic motivation may receive at least partial confirmation from his 
choice of a literary vehicle in which to convey his theory; it takes the form 
of a poem, written in hexameters, in which he recounts his instruction 
by a goddess in the Way of true thinking. Even if Parmenides was not 
an especially gifted poet, this choice of a vehicle says something about 
where he perceived the appeal of his theory to lie. This correspondence 
between the aesthetic motivations internal to a metaphysical theory 
and the means chosen for its communication is a theme that will recur 
throughout our story.
Parmenides’ bête noir, Heraclitus, put forward a theory with a very 
different sort of aesthetic appeal. Heraclitus’ view of the world is almost 
literally kaleidoscopic. The world consists of continuous flux and never-
ending transformations, held in balance by the tension of opposites, and 
symbolized by that most mobile of the “elements,” fire:
This world-order, the same for all, no god made or any man, but it always 
was and is and will be an ever-living fire, kindling by measure and going 
out by measure...
All things are an exchange for fire, and fire for all things; as goods are for 
gold, and gold for goods.3
The aesthetic element is evident when Heraclitus writes,
To god all things are beautiful and good and just, but men suppose some 
things to be just and others unjust.4
Here as with Parmenides, the aesthetic appeal of the view is reflected in 
that of its presentation; Heraclitus was undoubtedly more successful as 
an aphorist than Parmenides was as a poet.
Plato, of course, is an inescapable part of the story we are telling; in-
deed, this essay reveals itself as one more of those innumerable “footnotes 
on Plato.” For Plato, the case I am making scarcely requires argument; it 
3 Robinson, An Introduction to Early Greek Philosophy, 90, 91 (Diehls-Kranz 22 B 30).
4 Ibid., 92 (Diehls-Kranz 22 B 102).
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suffices to cite a familiar passage from Socrates’ speech (ostensibly quoted 
from Diotima) in the Symposium:
The person who has been instructed thus far about the activities of Love, who 
studies beautiful things correctly and in their proper order, and who then 
comes to the final stage of the activities of love, will suddenly see something 
astonishing that is beautiful in its nature. This, Socrates, is the purpose of 
all the earlier effort.
In the first place, it is eternal; it neither comes into being nor passes away, 
neither increases nor diminishes. Therefore, it is not beautiful in one respect 
while ugly in another, nor beautiful at one time while ugly at another, nor 
beautiful with reference to one thing while ugly with reference to something 
else, nor beautiful here while ugly there, as though it were beautiful to some 
while ugly to others. Moreover, the beautiful will not appear to this person 
to be something like a face or a pair of hands or any other part of the body, 
nor will it appear as a particular statement or a particular bit of knowledge, 
nor will it appear to exist somewhere in something other than itself, such 
as in an animal, in the earth, in the sky, or in anything else. On the contrary, 
it exists as itself in accordance with itself, eternal and uniform. All other 
beautiful things partake of it in such a way that, although they come into 
being and pass away, it does not, nor does it become any greater or any less, 
nor is it affected in any way. When someone moves through these various 
stages ... and begins to see this beauty, he has nearly reached the end.5
Once again, beauty in the metaphysical conception is matched by beauty in 
its presentation; I think there will be little argument that Plato’s dialogues 
are the single most outstanding literary creation in the entire history of 
philosophy.
There is no doubt that similar motivation appears in Plato’s follower 
Plotinus, in spite of his paradoxical insistence that the One is not beautiful, 
but rather “beyond beauty”:
[The soul] must, I say, withdraw from understanding and its objects and from 
every other thing, even the vision of beauty. For everything beautiful comes 
5 Plato, Symposium, 210e-211b, in The Symposium and The Phaedrus, Plato’s Erotic 
Dialogues, translated with introduction and commentaries by William S. Cobb (Albany: 
SUNY Press, 1993), 48.
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after it and is derived from it, as all daylight from the sun. It is for this reason 
that Plato says that the One is ineffable in spoken or written word.6
In this connection we may recall the remark of A. H. Armstrong that 
Plotinus “very often represents the One-Good as That to which no 
predicates and no determinations can be applied because It is more 
and better than the reality of which It is the source, and Its excellence 
goes beyond the resources of our thought and language.”7 Surely the 
phrase in the quotation, “even the vision of beauty,” is significant, 
indicating that somehow this vision is closer than anything else to 
the truth about the inexpressible One, even while it necessarily falls 
short of that truth.
It would be easy to go on drawing out similar thoughts from the great 
medievals, all of whom were profoundly influenced, directly and indirectly, 
by Plato and Plotinus. Life is short, however, and so must philosophy be, 
if it hopes to have a living audience! So we skip forward some fifteen 
centuries, and take as our next example Leibniz. Leibniz’ thought is rich 
and complex, but it would be difficult to deny that aesthetic motivations 
play an important role in it. He may well have agreed with sentiments 
of the sort we have seen in Plato and Plotinus; my point here, however, 
concerns rather the aesthetic appeal Leibniz found in the system of 
monads that was the core of his metaphysic. He held that “each possible 
[universe] has a right to claim existence in proportion to the perfection it 
involves.” Furthermore, “perfection” is defined in terms that carry strong 
aesthetic overtones: the system of monads “is the means of obtaining the 
greatest possible variety, together with the greatest possible order: in other 
words, it is the means of obtaining as much perfection as possible.” Pierre 
Bayle, Leibniz states, “was inclined to believe that I attributed to God 
too much, and even more than is possible. But he was unable to adduce 
any reason why this universal harmony, due to which every substance 
exactly expresses all the others through the relations it has with them, 
6 Plotinus, Enneads, VI. 9, in Source Book in Ancient Philosophy, Revised Edition, ed. 
Charles M. Bakewell (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1939), 397–398.
7 A. H. Armstrong, An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy, 3rd Edition (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1963), 181. Note also Armstrong’s comment that “Not infrequently, in spite of his 
carelessness about style ... the power of his thought forces him to a great magnificence 
of expression” (Ibid., p. 176).
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should be impossible.” Admiring his own theory, Leibniz exclaims, “Thus 
there is nothing uncultured, sterile, or dead in the universe, no chaos, 
no disorder, though this may be what appears. It would be about the 
same with a pond seen from a distance: you would perceive a confused 
movement, a squirming of fishes, if I may say so, without discerning the 
single fish.”8 I do not claim that aesthetic reasons were the only reasons 
Leibniz had for embracing this theory, but there can be no doubt that 
they were for him important reasons.
Skipping forward another two centuries, we come to a philosopher 
who may well be the most outstanding metaphysician of the twentieth 
century — Alfred North Whitehead. Like Leibniz, Whitehead crafted a 
rich and complex metaphysical system, and here also one could hardly 
deny that aesthetic considerations play a major role. He did not, it would 
seem, view God as himself the supreme instance of beauty, so much as 
the instigator of both order and novelty in the world, with the aim of 
bringing the world-system into a condition of great intrinsic beauty and 
harmony. In setting up the Cosmological Problem — the problem which is 
to be resolved by a proper understanding of the role of God — Whitehead 
develops two pairs of polar opposites: permanence/flux, and order/novelty. 
Both these contrasts, I submit, are essentially aesthetic in nature, and they 
set the tone for what follows concerning God: ethical considerations, 
while not without relevance, are in a manner submerged and subordinated 
to the aesthetic goal. The final resolution of these opposites, furthermore, is 
established through the harmonization of the struggles and the triumphs 
of finite beings in the consequent nature of God:
The wisdom of subjective aim prehends every actuality for what it can be in 
such a perfected system — its sufferings, its sorrows, its failures, its triumphs, 
its immediacies of joy — woven by rightness of feeling into the harmony of 
the universal feeling … The revolts of destructive evil, purely self-regarding, 
are dismissed into their triviality of merely individual facts; and yet the good 
they did achieve in individual joy, in individual sorrow, in the introduction 
of needed contrast, is yet saved by its relation to the completed whole. The 
image … under which this operative growth of God’s nature is best conceived, 
8 W. G. von Leibniz, Monadology 54, 58, 59, 69. In Monadology and Other Philosophical 
Essays, translated and edited by Paul Schrecker and Anne Martin Schrecker (Indianapolis: 
Library of Liberal Arts, 1965), 156, 157, 159.
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is that of a tender care that nothing be lost. … He does not create the world, 
he saves it; or, more accurately, he is the poet of the world, with tender 
patience leading it by his vision of truth, beauty, and goodness.”9
God as “the poet of the world” — with that one phrase, Whitehead himself 
makes my case, and I have no need to say more.
My final example is none other than Ludwig Wittgenstein — not 
the Wittgenstein of the Investigations, who as we all know was no 
metaphysician, but rather the early Wittgenstein of the Tractatus. In 
the Tractatus, I acknowledge, the aesthetic element is somewhat more 
subtle than with our other examples, yet I think it is both present and 
important. The overall effect is perhaps similar to that of a geometric 
abstraction — but geometric abstractions can have their own kind of 
beauty; think of the paintings of Mondrian. Beyond this, I submit that 
a further aesthetic element is contributed by the paradoxes integral to 
Wittgenstein’s enterprise, paradoxes that create a sense of mystery with 
a powerful aesthetic appeal, something like a philosophical version of 
an Escher engraving. One major paradox is found in the statement of 
a metaphysical view which includes the assertion that metaphysical 
views cannot be stated; this is the ladder we must throw away after 
we have climbed up it. There is also the paradox of what he termed 
the “second part,” of his work, the ethical part which Wittgenstein 
did not write but which is nevertheless, according to him, the most 
important part of his philosophical work!10 Furthermore, considerable 
artistic skill is expressed in the literary form of the Tractatus, including 
such unforgettable aphorisms as “The solution of the problem of life is 
seen in the vanishing of the problem.”11 There are also the wonderful, 
hymn-like rhythms of the opening sentences of the work. I’ve often 
thought one could almost get away with reading these sentences as one 
of the lessons in a church service. People wouldn’t understand them, 
9 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, Corrected 
Edition edited by David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne (New York: The Free 
Press, 1978), 346.
10 See his letter to Ludwig von Ficker, in Brian McGuinness, Wittgenstein: A Life: 
Young Ludwig 1889–1921 (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1988), 288.
11 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, German text with translation 
by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), 6.521, p. 149.
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of course, but the sound and cadence seem just about right for such 
an occasion:
The world is all that is the case.
The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
The world is determined by the facts, and by their being all the facts.
For the totality of facts determines what is the case, and also whatever is 
not the case.
The facts in logical space are the world.12
I submit that these aesthetic features of the Tractatus go quite a long 
way in accounting for the continuing fascination of this work for many 
philosophers.
It is my hope that I have persuaded you of my general claim, that 
beauty has been and remains an important element in the creation and 
reception of metaphysical views. But what shall we make of this fact? 
What, if anything, is its broader significance? Our erstwhile friends, the 
logical positivists, would have been ready with a response. Beauty and 
other “emotive” considerations are not merely important for the practice 
of metaphysics; they constitute the only content of metaphysical theories, 
which are simply misunderstood if they are viewed as having any cognitive 
significance. It follows from this that, if we do not follow Hume’s recom-
mendation to consign the works of metaphysics to the flames, we should 
at least turn them over to the literary critics for appropriate disposal.
But of course, hardly anyone thinks this way any more. A response 
more typical of contemporary philosophers would be that the aesthetic 
properties of metaphysical theories, while perhaps important for effec-
tive presentation. are simply irrelevant to whatever cognitive value these 
theories may possess. Believing a theory because it is beautiful is akin 
to believing there are fish in the pond because we should like to catch 
some for our dinner. This may seem a natural and initially plausible 
response, but examined more closely it faces serious difficulties. One 
such difficulty is that of accounting for the role of aesthetic values in 
the assessment of scientific theories, which are frequently taken as a 
model of the right kind of hard-headed rationality. It is said that Albert 
Einstein slept peacefully through the first serious test of his general 
12 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 1–1.13, p. 7.
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theory of relativity, involving the deflection of light from a distant star 
by the gravitational attraction of the sun during a solar eclipse. He later 
told his friend Max Planck, who spent a sleepless night awaiting the 
results, that he need not have worried; a theory as beautiful as this one 
could not have failed to be confirmed!13 In a similar vein Thomas Nagel, 
reflecting on some of C. S. Peirce’s thoughts about science, remarks that 
“the idea of a natural sympathy between the deepest truths of nature and 
the deepest layers of the human mind, which can be exploited to allow 
gradual development of a truer and truer conception of reality, makes 
us more at home in the universe than is secularly comfortable.”14 Nagel 
nevertheless finds the idea of such a “natural sympathy” compelling, and 
tries to console his naturalistically-minded friends with the thought that 
“one can admit such an enrichment of the fundamental elements of the 
natural order without going over to anything that should count literally 
as religious belief.”15
The denial of the cognitive relevance of beauty is not merely in conflict 
with scientific practice; it is also question-begging. To be sure, if we knew 
at the outset that human life and human minds are the accidental by-
products of purposeless forces that have operated without thought for 
them or anything else — if we knew this, then it might be reasonable to 
conclude that the human sense of beauty is without cognitive significance. 
But of course, we do not know this; on the contrary, whether or not this 
naturalistic hypothesis is correct is precisely one of the questions that 
metaphysical inquiry needs to address. If, then, we wish to proceed in a 
way that leaves it open whether this, or some more human-friendly view 
of the universe, is correct, we should also leave it open that our awareness 
of beauty is to some degree a pointer to the truth of things. Not every 
beautiful theory can be true — Einstein went too far there, if indeed he 
was wholly serious in his remark to Planck — but perhaps beauty is, in 
some degree, an indication of the cognitive value, the truth-likeness if 
you will, of our theories of the world. This is the possibility that will be 
explored in the remainder of this paper.
13 Karl W. Giberson, “The Patent Clerk from Mount Olympus,” Books and Culture, 
November/December 2005: 37.
14 Thomas Nagel, The Last Word (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 130 
(emphasis in original).
15 Nagel, The Last Word, 132.
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Suppose, then, that we assume provisionally that the aesthetic value of 
a metaphysical view counts to some degree in favor of its truth. Can we go 
further, and say which particular aesthetic qualities are most relevant? This 
is an extremely difficult question. We should not succumb to complete 
aesthetic relativism, but it cannot be denied that human beings exhibit 
a wide range of variability in their aesthetic responses. This variability, 
furthermore, will almost certainly prove to be relevant to the question of 
which metaphysical theory is most aesthetically satisfying. (Recall Quine’s 
preference for desert landscapes!) The challenge, then, is to put forward 
aesthetic criteria with some determinate content, without simply engaging 
in special pleading for one’s own preferred metaphysical conclusions. As 
with other journeys between Scylla and Charybdis, there is a considerable 
likelihood of shipwreck, but one can only do one’s best. I have three 
criteria to suggest.
First, an aesthetically satisfying metaphysic must exhibit convincingly both 
the multiplicity in the world and its underlying unity. This of course is the old 
standard, “variety in unity,” which is axiomatic for aesthetic analysis. The 
criterion is recognized explicitly in Leibniz’ combination of the “greatest 
possible variety” with the “greatest possible order,” and in Whitehead’s 
polarity of order and novelty. Sheer unresolved diversity lacks cohesion 
and suggests a mere catalog of contents, but unrelieved unity becomes 
sterile and empty; neither is aesthetically satisfying. Parmenides pretty 
clearly fails if judged by this criterion; Heraclitus may also be in trouble, 
though this is less clear. For Plato the problem of “the one and the many” 
becomes a central theme for philosophical reflection, and it has remained 
so ever since.
My second criterion is somewhat less obvious. I propose that an aes-
thetically compelling metaphysic must give a central role to the values pertaining 
to living creatures and especially to persons. The reason this is not so obvious 
is that there are numerous aesthetic values that are formal in nature and 
that, like “variety in unity,” do not pertain in any special way to living 
creatures or to persons (except, of course, that it takes living beings to 
appreciate them). Nevertheless, I maintain that the values peculiar to life 
and to personality occupy a privileged place in our aesthetic responses, 
and that a metaphysic that fails to honor this will prove to be aesthetically 
unsatisfying. As evidence, I point to the fact that by far the preponderance 
of the greatest works of art feature these values, by way of representing 
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human beings, or animals, or sometimes supernatural beings in human-
like or animal-like guises. This holds true from the Winged Victory and the 
marbles of the Parthenon to the drawings of Leonardo and Rembrandt 
and the paintings of Renoir and Picasso. There are numerous exceptions, 
of course. But even landscapes devoid of human and animal figures tend to 
include features that signal to us the human relevance of what is portrayed. 
The Chinese mountain-scape has a scholar’s pavilion or a hermit’s hut; 
Monet’s water lilies are found in a garden tended by human hands and 
intended for human enjoyment.
One could object that this fact about our aesthetic preferences merely 
reflects our narcissistic human self-preoccupation, and has no wider im-
portance. But to adopt that stance would be to revert to a position we have 
already examined and found to be question-begging: that the existence 
of human persons and the things they value is merely accidental, and has 
no significance for the nature of things in general. Our present stance, in 
contrast, is one in which we take seriously the aesthetic values humans do 
in fact appreciate, and consider where they may point if taken as a clue 
concerning the truth of things.
Nevertheless, the pre-eminence suggested here for the values of life 
and personality comes into serious conflict with trends in contempo-
rary metaphysics, especially with reductive versions of materialism and 
naturalism. Whitehead formulated the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness” 
in order to protest the tendency to take the abstractions of theoretical 
physics as representing ultimate reality. His own philosophy, significantly 
termed by him the “philosophy of organism,” was designed in part as a 
corrective to this tendency. Even those of us who are unable to embrace 
his philosophy in its details may well consider his objection here to be 
well-founded.
My third and final point is perhaps not aptly termed a criterion; I put 
it forward, not as a requirement for a metaphysic that will be aesthetically 
satisfying, but rather as a desideratum. My proposal is that a metaphysic 
that affords the greatest possible aesthetic satisfaction will be one in which the 
ultimate reality is also the supreme object of aesthetic contemplation. This is 
what Parmenides, and Plato, and Plotinus were seeking, and believed 
themselves to have found; it also captures a central feature of the thought 
of Anselm, Spinoza, Jonathan Edwards, and many others before and since. 
Clearly, this represents the maximum demand that aesthetics can make 
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upon metaphysics, and some will find that it exceeds what can reasonably 
be asked. To be sure, for the promise of this approach to be realized more 
is needed than the mere postulation of an ultimate Beauty which is also 
the final Real. The existence of such an entity must be made vivid to 
the metaphysical imagination, and this will almost certainly call (among 
other things) for a fuller and more definite account of its properties. (This 
by the way points to a difficulty for the more severe forms of negative 
theology, for example as practiced by Gordon Kaufmann and John Hick. 
One cannot readily get enough of a grasp on a Real characterized only 
in negative terms, to feel very joyous or worshipful about it.) Many will 
revert here to our second criterion, and will insist that the ultimate Beauty 
must possess many of the attributes of personality, no doubt understood 
in some analogical fashion. Parmenides and Spinoza will demur, and their 
objections must be duly considered. Nor is it my contention that questions 
such as these can be settled on aesthetic grounds alone. My aim has been 
to gain for aesthetics a place in the metaphysical conversation, not to turn 
metaphysics into an aesthetic monologue. So there is still need for all of the 
arguments and counter-arguments, as well as testimonies of experience and 
claims about proper basicality. Suppose, however, that all of this has been 
done — all the arguments carefully formulated and evaluated, all of the 
testimonies given their due weight, all the objections heard and considered. 
If, when all that has been done, we are able to arrive at a warranted belief 
in an aesthetic Object of the sort here described — then at last, we shall 
have found the Truth that is Beauty, the Beauty that is Truth.
